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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews evidence on the impact of EU policies on global food security, focusing on 
four EU policy areas: agricultural policy, bioenergy policy, trade policy, and development (food 
aid) policy.  Old concerns related to the detrimental impact of EU farm subsidies, food aid and 
tariffs on poor countries’ food security. New concerns relate to impacts of EU food standards 
and bioenergy policies.  The EU policies which created the largest distortions on global markets 
(in the area of trade, agriculture, food aid, and bioenergy) have been substantially reformed 
over the past decades. Recent global food price fluctuations have also re-emphasized that the 
impact of EU policies on the poor’s food security differ depending on whether these are 
consumers or producers, or whether countries are exporters or importers.  Overall, our review 
explains that in many areas the impact of EU policies on global food security is less obvious 
and more complex than often argued.  
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1. Introduction 
Many aspects of EU policies affect global agricultural markets and food security. They 
include the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EU bioenergy policy, trade policy, 
development aid policy, and, through different mechanisms, the EU’s macroeconomic and 
immigration policies. Development organizations have long criticized the lack of coherence 
of EU policies and the conflicting consequences on developing countries, including on food 
security. For example, the EU used to stabilize its domestic agricultural markets thanks to 
variable high tariffs and export refunds (i.e. subsidies). This led to dumping agricultural 
surplus production at low prices on world markets for decades. This hurt net-sellers of food 
products in developing countries and undermined local production. For that reason, the CAP 
was accused of undermining EU development policy that was precisely trying to help building 
local food supply. The EU’s renewable energy policy (biofuels), and the EU trade policy 
(tariffs, restrictive import standards) were also accused of incoherence with EU efforts to fight 
nutrition and food insecurity. A key question today is whether these criticisms are still valid?  
Much has changed over the past 20 years. Both the EU agricultural policy and the food 
aid policy have experienced dramatic reforms over the last decades. The EU has granted the 
poorest countries generous pro-development trade preferences (such as the Everything But 
Arms initiative), whose purpose was to help developing countries' producers. In addition, the 
“food crisis” of the late 2000s has reminded everybody that the impact of food prices on food 
security is complex: the consequences are often opposite for food consumers and food 
producers in poor countries. At the same time, new areas of critique are that EU food 
standards are creating non-tariff barriers to trade and excluding poor farmers from access to 
markets, worsening their food security, and that EU bioenergy policies are hurting the poor’s 
food security if one takes into account global price effects. 
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In this paper we review evidence on the impact of EU policies on global food security. 
Needless to say we need to limit our ambition to what is possible within the framework of this 
relatively short review paper. First, we focus on a subset of four EU policy areas, i.e. the 
CAP, bioenergy policy, trade policy, and development (food aid) policy. Second, we focus on 
“global food security”, i.e. on the impact of these policies on food security in developing 
countries. Third, while we recognize that there are multiple channels through which EU 
policies may influence various aspects of food security3, we focus on how it affects the poor 
through prices and incomes and to a lesser extent through access to technology and inputs – 
and thus how it affects their food security indirectly. While this focus limits the analysis, it 
nevertheless covers a broad set of issues and effects. A recurring theme throughout our paper 
is that the impact of EU policies on global food security is less obvious and more complex 
than often argued.  
The paper is organized as follows. Since one of the main channels that EU policies 
affect global food security is through (agricultural and food) markets and prices, we start with 
a discussion on how changes in markets, trade and prices affect global food security 
(Section 2). In the following sections we discuss how the EU policy areas we focus on affect 
markets and prices and thus food security (Sections 3-7). Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Food Prices, Volatility and Food Security 
 
When discussing the impact of EU policies on food security, it is crucial to have a 
clear understanding on how agricultural and food prices and trade affect global food security.  
                                                 
 
 
3 “Food (and nutrition) security” (FNS) and its different components (availability, access, utilization of food, and 
stability of these components), have been defined rather precisely after decades of controversies, in particular 
under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(Pangaribowo, et al, 2013). For an elaborate discussion of the potential mechanisms through which various EU 
policies may affect FNS and its different components, see Guariso et al (2015). 
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Price Levels 
Only a few years ago the emphasis in the public debate was on how low food prices 
were hurting the poor’s food security, as summarized in the following statement from 2005: 
“The long-term downward trend in agricultural commodity prices threatens the food security 
of hundreds of millions of people in some of the world's poorest developing countries where 
the sale of commodities is often the only source of cash.”4 After the dramatic increase of food 
prices in 2006-2008 many reports emphasized the problems caused by high food prices on 
global food security, reflected in the following statement: “rising food prices … threaten the 
food security of poor people around the world. … [and] can have long-term, detrimental 
effects on peoples’ health and livelihoods.”5 This change in emphasis was widespread 
(Swinnen, 2011).  
Basic economic household models imply that the impact of price changes on poor 
people and their food security are conditional on several factors. First, many poor households 
in developing countries are both producers and consumers of food and are thus affected in 
different ways by price changes.6 Second, local prices may differ from world market prices 
(and changes), as the former are affected by various policies (trade policy, taxes, etc.), by 
infrastructure and institutions, and by the industrial organization of the food chain. Third, 
short-run effects may differ from long-run effects, as pass-through may take some time.  
                                                 
 
 
4 FAO newsroom, Agriculture commodity prices continue long-term decline, 15 February 2005, Rome/Geneva. 
http://www.fao.org/newsroom/EN/news/2005/89721/index.html 
5 IFPRI, Annual Report 2007-08, p. 3 
6 By 2010 around 12.5% of the people in the world were undernourished (FAO, 2012) and less than 21% of the 
people were living below the poverty line (World Bank, 2013). The vast majority (more than 70%) of poor and 
food insecure people are depending on agriculture for their incomes: around 50% were small farmers and 20% 
households whose main income is agricultural wages (UNDP, 2005). 
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While these basic economic arguments were well known, they were often ignored in 
the food security debate. For example, there was hardly any mentioning of the benefits of low 
food prices for urban consumers and net consuming rural households during the pre-2006 low 
price era, and there has been little emphasis on the benefits for producers in poor countries 
from high food prices during the public debate following the food price spikes (Swinnen and 
Squicciarini, 2012). 
Recent empirical studies, however, have shed light on these mixed effects of prices on 
global food security and poverty (Ivanic and Martin, 2015). Macro-indicators suggest that 
poverty and food security, on average, improved over the 2005-2015 decade despite (or 
because of) high prices and that the number of poor and food insecure people declined by 
between 50 and 250 million people (Headey, 2013; Ravallion, 2013). Based on cross-country 
evidence on self-assessed food security indicators, both Headey (2013) (across the globe) and 
Verpoorten et al. (2013) (for Africa) find that there is much heterogeneity at the national and 
regional levels – and among households and that the heterogeneity of food security effects are 
consistent with economic predictions, as they were (positively) correlated with economic 
growth and net food production (exports), both at the household and country level.7 A rapidly 
growing number of empirical micro-studies confirm that farmers and rural households have 
benefited from high food prices and that poverty and food insecurity increased among net 
consuming households.8 
                                                 
 
 
7 Verpoorten et al. (2014) find that across 50,000 households in the African survey, self-reported food security 
improved on average in rural households, while it worsened in urban households, during the 2007-2010 period of 
high prices. 
8 Arndt et al. (2012) for Mozambique; Ferreira et al. (2013) for Brazil; Friedman et al. (2011) for Pakistan; and 
Martin-Prevel, et al. (2012) for Ethiopia. Isik-Dikmelik (2010) finds that rice price increases (following 
liberalization) in Vietnam led to broad based and pro-poor growth since many of the poor are farmers and, on 
average, consumers typically have higher incomes. Yamauchi and Dewina (2012) find that in rural Indonesia 
food producers experienced significantly income growth, while non-producers’ incomes fell, thereby narrowing 
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Several recent studies also point out that wage effects are important for the very 
poorest, and that also net consuming rural households may benefit from higher agricultural 
prices if one accounts for price induced wage increases.9 Finally, some recent simulation 
studies have integrated the different effects (including distinguishing between short-run and 
medium-run effects of price changes) and concludes that except for urban consumers and very 
short run effects, higher agricultural prices reduce poverty and food security on aggregate 
(Heady, forthcoming; Headey and Martin, 2016). 
 
Price Volatility 
 
An issue which was strongly emphasized in the recent public debate is the impact of 
increased price volatility on food security. A recurring argument is that price volatility is 
undesirable as it causes inefficiencies and reduces growth in the absence of insurance and 
credit markets (Dawe and Timmer, 2012). This is because unexpected price changes make it 
difficult for consumers and producers to make optimal decisions and it reduces their 
confidence in the market and in returns on investment. Therefore, following 2006-2008, many 
policy reports have emphasized the importance of reducing price volatility (e.g. FAO, 2011; 
Prakash, 2011; World Bank, 2012). With market imperfections in insurance and other 
markets, government interventions to reduce price volatility can be efficiency enhancing.  
Yet, studies which have explicitly modeled the effects of price volatility on consumer 
and producer welfare yield more nuanced conclusions (Gouel, 2014; Pieters and Swinnen, 
                                                 
 
 
inequality (the income gap).  The same follows from studies simulating the impact of biofuel policies on poverty 
and food security in China (e.g. Huang et al. (2012)  
9 Jacoby (2016) finds this for Indian rural households.  Lasco et al. (2008) also find that wages adjust strongly to 
rice price changes in the Philippines.  Krivonos and Olarreaga (2010) also conclude that labor market effects are 
important when measuring the impact of food price increases on poverty and food security in Brazil. 
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2016), similar in spirit to the conclusions on the effect of the price level.10 For households that 
both consume and produce food, the impact of price volatility on their welfare depends on 
their marketable surplus, risk aversion and income and price elasticities (Barrett, 1996; Myers, 
2006). If the household is a net-seller of agricultural products and is risk averse, the household 
is more likely to suffer from price volatility. Bellemare et al. (2013), who use data from 
Ethiopia, conclude that price volatility produces net welfare losses, but the losses are 
increasing in household income, meaning that it is not the poorest but those who produce a 
marketable surplus who suffer more. In summary, these findings suggest that price volatility 
reduces welfare and food security of some groups but the effects are not meaningful for all in 
society, and not necessarily for the poorest. For the poorest, Gouel (2014) suggests that food 
price volatility is costly not because of the volatility per-se, but because it leads to potentially 
high prices that can have long-term consequences because the associated decreased health or 
school expenditures can have irreversible consequences that cannot be compensated by the 
later benefits of low food prices. 
 
3. EU agricultural policy  
For decades, the EU used a system of variable levies, then flexible tariffs, and export 
refunds to manage its domestic market. This was largely done at the expense of third 
countries, which experienced lower prices and more volatility when the EU used such 
                                                 
 
 
10 The arguments are based on the original arguments by Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) and Turnovsky et al. 
(1980) who show that price volatility fluctuations around the mean may actually benefit consumers if the price 
elasticity of demand is high, if their budget spend on food is rather small and/or if they are risk loving – a 
generalization of a basic argument made by Waugh (1944). Poor consumers in developing countries who spend a 
large amount of their budget on food and who are risk averse will be likely to benefit from stable prices. 
Similarly, producers may use less inputs and have lower profits if prices are volatile and uncertain (Sandmo, 
1971) – but they may also have positive effects from price volatility (Oi, 1961). 
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instruments to clear its domestic market. EU subsidies to production and exports helped EU 
farmers but made competition difficult for local producers in developing countries. The EU 
policy lead to cheap imports of flour, beef or dairy products in many countries, including in 
West Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean and even India (dairy) (Miner and Morgan, 
2004). These cheap imports benefited local consumers but hurt local producers (Panagarya, 
2005). The EU’s impact on the world market increased in the 1970s and 1980s as the EU 
itself expanded, and as subsidies and tariffs turned the region from an importer of agricultural 
and food products into a net exporter of food. 
The CAP has experienced major reforms since 1992. These reforms were driven by a 
combination of factors (Swinnen, 2008, 2015). In particular, the budget cost of export refunds 
became considerable for the EU budget in the 1980s and forced a change in the price support 
system.11 Multilateral pressure by third countries also played a role. Outside pressure came 
from exporting nations such as the US and Australia, and from developing countries and 
international organizations that accused the EU of causing poverty and hunger in poor rural 
households. In response to these internal and external pressures, the EU introduced a series of 
reforms, spanning three decades, to reduce the impact of its CAP on international markets 
(Moehler 2008).  
These reforms led the EU to get rid of the measures that led to subsidize the export of 
agricultural surplus into developing countries. Such export refunds have been fully eliminated 
since June 2013, and the EU has committed not to provide export subsidies in the future at the 
                                                 
 
 
11 Export refunds made it possible to clear EU markets when production was boosted and consumption deterred 
by high prices which were set administratively. EU import tariffs and export subsidies varied to capture the 
difference between (fixed) domestic prices and (fluctuating) world market prices. This system of variable tariffs 
and subsidies ensured stable prices inside the EU, but intensified fluctuations outside the EU since export 
subsidies would be even higher when world market prices were lower. 
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end of 2015. As Figure 1 illustrates, the amount of distortionary subsidies that distort markets, 
captured by the World Bank’s NRA and the OECD’s PSE indicators, has declined very 
strongly in the 1990s and 2000s. Today, most of the support to EU farmers goes through 
direct payments which provide only limited incentive to produce and export more.12  
There are nevertheless still some impacts of EU agricultural policies on developing 
countries. First, the considerable amount of subsidies provided to EU farms (some €56 billion 
per year) still have some effects on world market due to risk aversion and wealth effects 
(Gohin and Zhen, 2016).  However, there is consensus that they are much more decoupled 
from production decisions and trade than past agricultural policies. In addition, the trade (and 
thus global food security) impacts are limited compared to those caused by recent policy 
developments in the U.S and emerging countries. Indeed, figures compiled by OECD (2016) 
and Anderson (2016) show that there has been an significant increase in farm support which is 
coupled to production in the U.S. and in emerging countries such as China, Indonesia or 
Russia (when adjusted for currency depreciation) over the recent years. 
Second, when world prices were high in the mid 1990s and in the late 2000s, the EU 
lowered temporarily tariffs on grains (e.g. corn), so as to provide some relief to EU livestock 
producers. Inversely, tariffs were increased when world market prices went down.  These 
policy changes may have contributed to amplify the volatility of world prices to a limited 
extent. However the EU policy’s impact on global price fluctuations was limited compared to 
                                                 
 
 
12 From the mid 2000s onwards the vast majority of EU farm support (€35 billion euros per year) is provided as 
Single Farm Payments which are largely decoupled from production. After the reforms, prices in the EU are 
close to those on world markets and the impact of the current CAP on global prices is much smaller than in the 
past. Several studies show the large impact of EU policies on global food markets during the 1980s (e.g. Van 
Meijl and van Tongeren 2002). Recent studies show that EU policies no longer had a significant impact on the 
price volatility of major food commodities (Anderson and Nelgen 2013; Anderson et al. 2014). Unlike other 
countries, such as Russia and China, the EU has also not introduced export constraints for food during the recent 
price spikes. 
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the export restrictions and export taxes that many emerging countries have implemented 
during these price peaks (Anderson et al 2014). 
In summary, while the EU policies still have some effect on world prices and thus 
potentially on food security in developing countries, today's CAP has a much smaller impact 
on world markets than in the past (Bureau & Jean 2013). The recent "recoupling" of some EU 
subsidies that took place in 2015 is limited to specific productions that do not seriously 
compete with poorest countries productions.  Similarly, Matthews (2014, p14) concludes that 
the recent CAP reforms will have “mixed and contradictory impacts” on the EU’s supply 
capacity and thus on global food security, and that the effects will be small: “the impacts of 
all these changes … will be very minor, particularly in the context of the swings in world 
market prices experienced since 2008” 
 
4. EU Bioenergy Policy 
 
The EU biofuel policy was originally presented as a way to reduce greenhouse gases 
emissions. However, supporting EU farm incomes by providing a new outlet for feedstocks 
was also a major objective when it was introduced in the early 2000s. This policy affects 
global food security as the EU’s biofuel mandate directly affects global prices, as well as 
environmental and social effects which could indirectly impact food security.  
The 2009 Renewable Energy Directive sets a target13 that de facto constitutes a 
blending mandate, i.e. a compulsory incorporation of biofuel in transport fuel. Such a mandate 
rigidifies the overall (food plus fuel) demand for feedstocks. As a consequence, considerable 
                                                 
 
 
13 The compulsory target set under the RED is 10% of road transportation fuel must be renewable. So far this 
mostly involves using biofuels given that these are the only liquid fuels that it the existing car fleet. The use of 
biogas remains marginal. 
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quantities of feedstocks have been diverted towards the energy market. In the EU, it is mostly 
rapeseed, and to a lesser extent sugar beets, wheat and corn. Biodiesel accounts for 79% of 
EU biofuel consumption (if one excludes biogas not used in transport fuel); the rest is mostly 
ethanol. Rapeseed oil is the dominant biodiesel feedstock in the EU, with a share in the 
feedstock of 66% in 2012 (source USDA GAIN). Imported palm oil is increasingly used for 
EU biodiesel production.14 The demand for palm oil is reinforced by new technologies which 
make it easier to use palm oil (hydro-treated vegetable oil). The demand for palm oil is also 
reinforced by the EU policy to favor the use of waste (tallow, used cooking oil, which benefit 
from a "double counting" in terms of compulsory blending requirement) in biofuels. Indeed, 
these products traditionally went to the cosmetic and detergent industry which now uses more 
palm oil, as the food industry does. 
EU support for biofuel thus result in higher world prices.15 Biofuel outlets have contributed to 
lower stocks of feedstocks worldwide and Wright (2012) has clearly shown that lower stocks  
make supply more inelastic. With both supply and demand more inelastic, the EU biofuel 
policy thus contributes to the amplification of price swings.16 There are also indirect impacts 
on global prices through Direct and Indirect Land Use Change (dLUC and iLUC) effects of 
the EU biofuel program (Valin et al, 2016). By diverting feedstuff (e.g. mostly rapeseed in the 
                                                 
 
 
14 Palm oil has become the second most important feedstock. The development of palm oil based biodiesel has 
been benefited from the development of hydrotreated biodiesel, at the expense of esters based on rapeseed oil 
(Fatty Acid Methyl Esters). 
15 With the exception of some markets for co-products, such as rapeseed cakes used for animal feed. See De 
Gorter et al (2015) and Valin et al (2016) for a review of the economic effects of the EU biofuel policy. 
16 The EU incentives for using biofuels contribute to higher prices ceteris paribus. Indeed, the biofuel policy 
support domestic prices by taking feedstock out of the food and feed markets. The old CAP took away some 
quantities from the domestic market and transferred them to the world market. While the biofuel policy transfers 
them to the energy market, whose demand elasticity is very large, due to the size of the fuel market. See Bureau 
et al (2010) and Valin et al (2016) for estimates of the price effects. 
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EU) into the energy market, biofuel policies induce price changes that cascade across 
products and markets through supply and demand effects and cross elasticities.17  
The EU biofuel policy thus affects food security in the same direction as the reform of 
the CAP (decoupling of support and end of export subsidies), i.e. by increasing world prices 
for agricultural products. Again, the impact will depend on the net producer/consumer status 
of the households (and the net export status of the countries) for the products whose prices are 
affected by the EU biofuel program.18  
While it was originally intended to provide an outlet to domestic producer of cereals 
and oilseeds19, the EU biofuel policy now contributes to drive up the demand for palm oil. 
Consequences for food security are controversial. The increased production of palm oil for 
export to the EU has stimulated the expansion of palm plantations. In South East Asia, this 
has led to (or at least gone together with) deforestation, massive fires of drained peatland ‒
some of them affecting health and economic activity in neighboring regions‒, degradation of 
water quality, changes in local climate and in the nitrogen cycle. 20 Non governmental 
organizations raise the issue of the long term consequences on food security caused by 
                                                 
 
 
17 For example, the increased demand of corn for ethanol causes by the U.S. biofuel mandate lead to expand US 
supply, at the expense of soybean. Because the EU and Chinese demand for soy, the price has gone up, resulting 
in a considerable increase in production in South America. More globally, changes in world prices can lead to 
transforming pasture, savannah or even rainforest into, say, soybean, cane rapeseed or palm oil production. 
18 Huang et al (2012) suggest that the US ethanol program is enhancing food security in China as most poor 
Chinese farming families who produce grain are net sellers, and the increased demand for grain of the US 
ethanol program thus increases their incomes. The situation may be different for net buying households.  
19 See Bureau et al (2010) who claim that in spite of the stated objective of reducing greenhouse gases emissions, 
the main driver for the EU biofuel policy was to provide outlets to the EU agricultural sector in the early 2000s. 
20 In Southeast Asia, 45% of sampled oil palm plantations came from areas that were forests in 1989. For South 
America, the percentage was 31%.(Vijai et al., 2016; Gibbs et al, 2010). Carlson et al (2012) provide 
information on the conversion of community land into large scale plantations in Indonesia. De Jong et al (2014) 
provide evidence of the disruption of oil palm plantations on water supply and water quality in Indonesia; 
Hamilton et al (2016) of palm related deforestation on the nitrogen cycle.  
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environmental degradation and competition with traditional farming systems (e.g., GRAIN, 
2014). They point out negative consequences on the environment on which poor people rely 
for their food security because of the degradation of natural capital that was a source of food 
for small farmers (e.g. Papua New Guinea), and also point out negative consequences on 
traditional farm system in African countries where there was a tradition of common use by 
local communities of land that was privatized for the development of palm plantations.21  
However, other authors find that the expansion of palm oil production, on large scale 
plantations as well as on small farms, result in employment and extra income, with positive 
consequences on the food security. In Indonesia, studies find that villages with oil palm as 
their main source of income show significantly lower rates of malnutrition and higher food 
consumption expenditures (Budidarsono et al. 2012; Euler et al. 2017). Edwards (2016) even 
estimates that 1.3 million Indonesians were lifted out of poverty between 2000-2010 due to oil 
palm expansion.  
In response to criticisms on the impact on food prices (in particular during the years of 
high food prices) and its environmental and sustainability impacts (in particular regarding 
palm oil expansion), the EU has introduced a series of policy adjustments by increasing 
biofuel requirements on GHG reductions compared to fossil fuels and by limiting the use of 
food crops in biofuels.22 It also requires an environmental certification of palm oil (which is 
                                                 
 
 
21 See Greenpeace (2012) among numerous NGO studies. Note, however that Nelson et al (2014) find that the 
primary driver of deforestation in Papua New Guinea is logging and that palm plantations proposals (that never 
materialize) are often a vector for "large-scale land grab under the guise of oil palm development".  
22 The EU RED now requires that biofuels reduce GHG emissions 50% from fossil fuels (prior to 2017  only a 
35% GHG reductions were required). If there are still strong incentives to use palm oil under the category of 
"used cooking oil", standard palm oil-based biodiesel only reduces GHG emissions 36 (Flach et al. 2016). 
Further, the EU RED has stipulations designed to reduce iLUC by limiting the use of food crops in biofuels 
(which includes both palm and rapeseed-based fuels). Biofuels derived from food crops are capped at 7% of 
transportation fuel use. The latest proposal to replace RED when it expires in 2020 calls for even stricter limits 
on "first generation" biofuels, i.e. those that are based on raw materials that are also used for food. 
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not required in the detergent industry where some of the demand is displaced) but which had 
only had a limited impact on deforestation and peatland fires (Cattau et al, 2016). 
Overall, there is a need to get a more comprehensive assessment of the impact on food 
security of the EU biofuel policy, taking into account on the one hand the income generated 
by the expansion of palm oil and the positive employment effects; and on the other hand the 
deterioration of ecosystems and natural capital. 
 
5. EU Development (Food Aid) Policy 
Assessing the impact of the development policies on food security would require 
investigating the success of failures of a large set of heterogeneous projects. There has been a 
significant increase in the share of EU development aid targeted to food and nutrition security 
(FNS) since the start of the food crisis -- much in line with the global increase in FNS in 
development aid (Guariso et al, 2014). However, Cockx and Francken (2016) find that 
evidence on the direct impact of EU development aid programs on global food security is 
inconclusive, and that while one would expect several of these programs to have positive 
effects, hard evidence is “surprisingly weak”. 
One highly publicized, and highly criticized, aid policy was the provision of in kind 
aid. Because food aid was sometime used to dispose EU agricultural surpluses, it was not 
always distributed when relevant and could squeeze local production out of local markets. 
Since the early 1990s, the EU has adopted a code of "best practice" in the provision of 
humanitarian food assistance (EC, 2008, 2013). That is, food aid is given in case of well 
identified need of humanitarian assistance, and as long as local markets can supply it, the 
priority is given to purchase local food. Evaluations show that these good practices have 
reduced the former perverse effects of food aid, even though some limitations of the current 
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policy in terms of nutritional aspects, and sometimes the nutritional issues associated to the 
distribution of local food were criticized (Haver et al., 2013).  
In addition, the use of in-kind food aid by the EU has diminished significantly over the 
past 20 years.  Figure 2 illustrates how in-kind food aid has declined from around 3 million 
tons per year in the early 1990s to much lower amounts in recent years. Part of this decline is 
due to the fact that agricultural surpluses (and therefore EU stocks) have diminished with the 
reform of the CAP. 
 
6. EU Trade Policy 
 
Two types of criticisms have been made to the EU trade policy. The first one is that 
demand for particular types of imports have resulted in expansion of export agriculture to the 
expense of self sufficiency, hence food security. One dimension of the problem stressed by 
several organizations is that large scale investments for export agriculture are often made at 
the expense of small farmers and communities' access to land, in particular in countries with 
weak institutions. The second criticism, on the opposite, is that the EU is described as 
"fortress Europe" that prevents developing countries to export productions in which they had 
a comparative advantage, i.e. agricultural products. 
There has been a long lasting debate on whether the development of export oriented 
agriculture was good for food security in developing countries. Several non-governmental 
organizations ‒ and a few academics‒ have claimed that such development was detrimental to 
the subsistence agriculture that allowed poorest people to feed themselves. Today, the debate 
is largely solved: there is large evidence that cash oriented production, including for exports, 
allows capital accumulation, investment and productivity gains (with positive spillovers on 
food production), while subsistence agriculture is a trap from which it is difficult to exit 
without further market integration (World Bank, 2007). Accusations that export crops such as 
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cotton, coffee or fresh vegetables "steal" land that is no longer available for subsistence crops 
have been largely proven unfounded (von Braun and Kennedy, 1994). Export crops have 
contributed to bringing investment capacity for local producers and to exit the vicious circle 
of subsistence agriculture. Moreover several recent studies show how revenues and access to 
inputs and technology through export value chains are stimulating food production at the 
household level by reducing capital and technology constraints and household-level spillovers 
(Minten et al 2009; Riera and Swinnen 2015).  
A more recent concern is whether the development of plantations for export crops 
results in depriving small farmers from land or other resources such as water in countries with 
weak institutions or corruption (Nolte et al, 2016; Rullia et al, 2012). Concerns about 
“resource grabbing" by foreign investors have been widely publicized in the media and are 
often quoted by NGOs such as People Forest, OXFAM and Friend of the Earth, and 
international organizations like FAO and IFPRI.  While there is ad hoc empirical evidence 
that Asian and Middle East companies and governments are attempting to secure agricultural 
supply by the acquisition of foreign land, often in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is no consensus 
on the size of the phenomenon (see Deiniger et al, 2011; HLPE, 2011; and a recent meta-
analysis by Vandergeten et al, 2016,).  
More specifically related to EU policies, NGOs also claim that there are a significant 
number of cases of EU investors in developing countries which, according to them, were 
developed at the expense of subsistence agriculture originating.23  Several of these 
investments were in response to changes in  EU policies such as the provision of trade 
                                                 
 
 
23 According to Knolte et al (2016), investment originating from the UK, the Netherlands, France, Jersey and 
Cyprus are involved in 315 concluded deals, covering nearly 7.3 million hectares. 
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preferences (investments in sugar production) or increased support for bioenergy (investments 
in ethanol, palm oil, jatropha production).24. The size and accuracy of this phenomenon 
remains unclear. The NGO coalition that monitors of land deals, concludes that some of them 
were consecutive to prior consent and information, but that a majority of them is imposed on 
(and rejected by) local communities. Their survey also suggests that compensation and 
payments are provided only in a minority of cases, and that there are cases of forced eviction 
and displacement. Their conclusion on employment and overall benefits are mixed, since 
many of the project lead to capital intensive agriculture with a low labor/land ratio (Knolte et 
al, 2016). However, a report by the Ecofys finds very little linkage between the EU demand 
for biodiesel and ethanol and land acquisitions and challenges many of the cases put forward 
by NGOs (Ecofys, 2013).  Also studies on large scale horticultural production in west Africa 
for exports to the EU show that these large-scale production systems are complementary to 
household farms and provide employment to the poorest with significant food security 
benefits and poverty reduction for local households (Maertens et al, 2012; Van den Broeck et 
al 2017).  Clearly, more careful research is needed in this area.  
The second line of criticism is, quite opposite, that the EU does not import enough 
from developing countries. Developing countries themselves, in particular through the G77 
group, have often lamented that EU trade policy did not provide enough export opportunities 
for agricultural products, a sector in which many have comparative advantages. They consider 
that more export revenues would allow them to secure access to food through domestic 
policies as well as imports. 
                                                 
 
 
24 See GRAIN et al (2014), Oxfam (2016) and the many reports quoted by Vandergeten et al (2016) in their 
references. A survey of various issues raised by NGOs that involve investments related to the EU market Ecofys 
(2013). 
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The EU used to impose tariffs on many commodities exported by developing 
countries, with the exception of mineral products and a few raw agricultural commodities. 
This is no longer the case. While the EU has maintained high tariffs on a Most Favored 
Nation basis (i.e. the regime that applies when there is no trade preference) on many 
agricultural goods, EU tariff protection has become very low for imports originating in 
developing countries. Over the last decades, the EU has granted developing countries many 
duties exemptions under a variety of agreements. The tariff preferences granted to Least 
Developed Countries under the Everything But Arms initiative, for example, are generous, in 
terms of product coverage and preferential margins. The regime makes it possible for the 50 
poorest countries to access the EU market without duties and quotas, and the EU Commission 
is keen at pointing out that the EU is by far the largest export market for Less Developed 
Countries. Large access was also granted under a variety of reciprocal agreements, so that 
exports from most sub-Saharan Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific countries and several North 
African countries (e.g. Jordan) face little duties. In summary, the EU fortress has become 
quite "porous" for developing countries (Bureau and Jean, 2013). 
Tariff preferences have a genuine impact on trade flows (Bureau et al., 2016; 
Copenhagen Economics, 2016). The opportunity for export diversification depends on the 
agreements but is noticeable for some regional ones, including Mediterranean countries 
(Scoppola et al., 2014). Limited, albeit positive, effects have been found for the poorest 
countries (Aghajanzadeh-Darzi et al., 2016; Scoppola et al., 2014). One reason is that the 
poorest countries are constrained in their exports to the EU by other factors, in particular 
product and process regulations (see also next section). For example, Least Developed 
Countries may not export animal products to the EU if they do not have demonstrated their 
capacity to deal quickly with a contagious disease outbreak (such as Foot and Mouth Disease, 
19 
 
 
 
African swine fever, etc.). Partly because of this reason, tariff free access has resulted in 
significant exports of only a narrow range of agricultural goods, such as sugar. 
There are many interrogations regarding bilateral agreements, and in particular the 
recent Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries. The budgetary consequences of the loss of tariff revenues for developing countries 
could endanger social policies, including some linked to food security. While in theory (and 
in the longer term) these revenue losses should be replaced by other forms of taxation, in 
practice this often does not happen, either because other taxable sectors have strong lobby 
power of because the institutional infrastructure is missing. However, studies that lament the 
loss in tariff revenues often neglect that in those countries there was often a poor rate of 
recovery of import taxes.  
The impact of competition from EU products for local producers remains disputed. 
One example is the difficulty of West African dairy producers to compete with imports 
originating from EU and New Zealand,).25 Because the EPAs are reciprocal agreement, they 
have resulted in a reduction of tariffs imposed to EU exports in those regions that have 
concluded an EPA, which could make it more difficult for local producers to compete with 
imports. Overall, empirical impact assessments of the EPAs find mixed food security effects 
for some of the poorest countries which lack infrastructure to benefit from export 
opportunities and raise taxes that might replace tariff revenues (Aghajanzadeh-Darzi et al., 
2016). One evidence of these mixed effects is that the negotiations before concluding the 
EPAs have been very difficult (they have stalled with the Central Africa region), there is still 
                                                 
 
 
25 In large West African cities such as Dakar, the dairy industry relies a lot on imported milkpowder. Local 
producers suffer from poor transportation and storage infrastructure for frluid milk, and sometimes from an 
unfavorable tax system (Senegal). See Diarra et al (2013).  
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a strong reluctance to ratify and implement the various agreements in African partner 
countries (with the exception of the EPA with Cariforum). 
 
7. EU Food Standards and Global Value Chains 26  
 
EU consumers in the 21st century are particularly concerned about the safety and 
quality of food. The EU food safety policies aim to protect consumer health through a farm-
to-fork safety approach, imposing traceability requirements throughout EU food chains (while 
taking into account international agreements, such as the sanitary and phytosanitary and 
Technical Barriers to Trade agreements under the WTO).27 The growth and spread of these 
food standards has triggered (a) a strong debate in trade policy on the extent to which these 
standards are new protectionist instruments, i.e. so-called Non-Tariff Measures or NTMs 
(Beghin, 2013); and (b) in development policy about the potential detrimental effects of these 
standards on poor farmers in developing countries which risk to be marginalized (Reardon et 
al., 2003). 
Some EU standards have been introduced to keep imports out and protect EU 
producers, but in most cases technical and sanitary regulations are introduced to protect 
consumers (Beghin et al, 2015). Yet, even in this case, regulations can represent obstacles for 
would be exporters from developing countries (Swinnen 2016, 2017). EU standards entail 
costs and can restrict trade, diminishing export opportunities for developing countries. 
                                                 
 
 
26 An issue which has been very controversial but which we do not cover explicitly as a separate issue is EU 
rules on GMOs. At this point, EU GMO regulations affect mostly EU agricultural production activities. There is 
an argument that these regulations also affect developing countries’ food security through trade and through 
regulatory spillovers (see e.g. Vigani et al, 2010). 
27 Not only has the public sector responded to the crises, but there has also been a rapid growth in private sector 
initiatives in the field of food safety and quality standards. Private standards are often more stringent than public 
ones (Fulponi, 2007; Vandemoortele & Deconinck, 2014). These include the GlobalGAP standard which is now 
used by a large number of the major retailers in the EU (and the world). 
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However, by providing a bridge between consumer concerns and preferences in EU countries 
and producers in developing countries, food standards can also be catalysts to developing 
countries' participation in trade (Maertens and Swinnen 2007). 
Empirical evidence on the costs related to EU food standards is mixed. Despite the 
more stringent standards, EU imports from developing countries have increased sharply 
during the past decades. Moreover, the growth has been strongest in sectors where standards 
are most trade constraining, which includes fruits, vegetables, seafood, fish, meat and dairy 
products, are also higher value products (Maertens and Swinnen, 2014). Some authors find 
evidence of high compliance costs with public standards, which are especially problematic for 
small producers, while other studies have estimated that the costs of compliance are only a 
small fraction of total production costs (Aloui and Kenny 2005).28 In many cases, compliance 
and certification costs are largely carried by exporters or by donor support (e.g. Subervie and 
Vagneron 2013; Kersting and Wollni 2012). Overall, there is mixed evidence in the empirical 
literature, suggesting that EU food standards can be, but are not necessarily, protectionist 
(Beghin et al. 2015).  
EU standards can also facilitate developing countries' access to EU food markets. 
Standards and certification schemes can reduce transaction costs and enhance consumer 
confidence in food product safety and quality. Several developing countries have been 
successful in complying with standards and ensuring their competitive position in high-value 
international markets (Jaffee and Henson, 2005). An important way through which rural farm-
households in developing countries can benefit from agri-food exports and the increased value 
                                                 
 
 
28 Also with respect to the costs of compliance and certification to private standards, evidence is mixed. Asfaw et 
al. (2010) measure the investment costs related to GlobalGAP to represent 30% of annual crop income for 
smallholders in Kenya, while the estimates by Graffham et al. (2007) differ enormously across different firms or 
farmer groups. See also Chiputwa and Qaim (2016). 
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in export sectors is through participating in value chains with exporters or overseas buyers. 
But whether or not smallholder farmers do share in the benefits from trade depends on the 
extent to which they are included in contract-farming arrangement and the impact that 
participation in contract-farming has on their incomes and well-being. Here too, the empirical 
evidence is mixed (Maertens et al., 2012; Reardon et al., 2009). Several empirical studies 
have documented that with increasing standards, a decreasing share of export produce is 
sourced from small farmers. Yet, other studies show that smallholders continue to be included 
in modern value chains, sometimes exclusively. Other studies find evidence that once farmers 
are included in contract schemes and high-value export chains, they benefit significantly.29  
A much overlooked issue in the welfare analyses of agri-food trade is that poor 
households may benefit through employment effects. High-standards trade creates new 
employment opportunities in labour-intensive processing and handling of produce, and on 
vertically integrated estate farms and large contracted farms. A shift from smallholder 
contract-farming to vertical integrated estate farming also entails a shift from production 
based on family labour to production based on hired labour. Employment in agro-industrial 
production and exporting companies is well-accessible for the poor and this employment 
appears to have a large positive effect on household incomes and food security.30 
 
                                                 
 
 
29 Maertens and Swinnen (2009) and Minten et al (2009) show major reductions in hunger and poverty from 
participation in horticultural value chains in Senegal and Madagascar. Handschuch et al. (2013), Asfaw et al. 
(2009) and Subervie and Vagneron (2013) find that smallholders' certification to GlobalGAP results in improved 
quality, increased volumes, higher farm-gate prices and higher net incomes from fruit or vegetable production 
for respectively Chile, Kenya and Madagascar. 
30 Recent empirical studies have documented that the development of such high value agro-industrial value 
chains creates substantial employment, for example in vegetable export sector in West Africa (Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009; Maertens et al.  2012; Vandenbroeck et al., 2017) and in the cut flower industry in East Africa 
(Mano et al., 2011), with benefits for food security (Van den Broeck and Maertens, 2017). 
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9. Conclusion  
We reviewed studies on the impact of EU policies on global food security. Given the 
size limits of this review, we focused on EU agricultural policy, bioenergy policy, trade 
policy, and development (food aid) policy. In the past, the CAP and EU trade and food aid 
policies were heavily restricting imports from developing countries and subsidizing EU 
exports, thereby affecting developing countries’ food security directly or indirectly through 
global prices. However, much has changed in the past 20 years. 
The most distortive policy elements have been substantially reformed and/or removed. 
While the EU still massively subsidizes its agriculture, the impact on global agricultural and 
food prices is limited because of a shift from subsidizing production to subsidizing farm 
incomes. While such subsidies do eventually impact production, they are far more detrimental 
for developing countries producers than the former production coupled payments and export 
refunds. In addition, the provision of in-kind food aid has been significantly reduced, and 
replaced by different forms of development aid which are less distortive to developing 
countries’ farmers markets. These reforms have contributed to higher prices on international 
markets. In brief, neither the EU agricultural policy nor the EU food aid policy have a 
considerable impact on world markets. And they no longer have significant negative 
consequences for food security. If anything the recent reforms enhanced aggregate food 
security. 
Increased support to EU biofuels has also tended to push global prices upwards, 
although the impact is likely limited (compared to e.g. biofuel programs in the US). The 
nature of the compulsory mandate set by the Renewable Food Directive, set in terms of 
percentage of fuel used in transport fuel, may result in a rigid demand that contributes to 
greater price instability. However, recent and ongoing changes in this Directive limit this 
phenomenon. 
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EU trade policy has also been reformed to remove export subsidies and developing 
countries have now much better access to the EU markets than in the past. The EU grants 
preferential treatment of exports from poor countries, helping them to find outlets for their 
market, in spite of many sanitary and regulatory obstacles. This has, overall, a positive impact 
on food security in these countries, through income generation and job creation. 
Interestingly, as EU policy reforms reduced its depressing impact on global markets in 
the 2000s, food prices spiked, raising concerns about the impact of high versus low food 
prices on food security. The price spikes changed the public debate about how policies that 
lowered agricultural prices (e.g. former CAP subsidies and EU export refunds) or pushed 
them up (e.g. EU support to biofuel) were good or bad for food security. In response, a series 
of careful empirical studies and simulations have shown that the impact confirms basic 
economic principles: i.e. that the impact depends on whether poor households are 
buyers/sellers of food and whether poor countries are importers/exporters of food. Most 
studies show that the aggregate net effect of higher agricultural prices has benefited aggregate 
food security and poverty reduction in the world, but that the impact at the country and 
regional level is heterogeneous (reflecting their production and consumption patterns). Even 
though a large share of poor farmers are net buyers of food, and are hit by higher prices as 
urban consumers are, steady agricultural prices stimulated revenues and investment in 
agriculture, and tend to have a positive impact on food security in the long run.  
Overall, a recurring theme from our review is that the impact of EU policies on global 
food security today is less obvious and more complex/nuanced than often argued. That said, 
there are still causes for concern. First, when the EU adjusts its tariff downwards to protect its 
livestock producers in case of high feedstock prices, it contributes to fueling the rise in world 
prices. This, and what remains of the blending mandate for first generation biofuel, feeds 
price fluctuations. Such fluctuations are detrimental to risk-averse consumers and producers 
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who try to invest and sell agricultural products but have difficulty coping with volatile 
markets. Second, while the EU biofuel policy may enhance income and reduce malnutrition 
for poor households working in the palm oil sector, there remains concern about the impact of 
the expansion of palm plantations throughout the world. In several countries (Asia, but 
increasingly South America and Africa), the way these plantations expand seem to result in 
large scale destruction of natural capital and future production potential, even though 
evidence of the global impact on employment and income is controversial. 
Third, EU food standards have a major impact on trade and global value chains. At the 
same time they create obstacles and opportunities for developing countries to benefit from 
access to (rich) EU consumer markets. Empirical evidence documents a mixture of effects in 
terms of protectionist impacts and of how the institutional organization of global value chains 
has adopted to address ever tightening public and private EU standards regarding safety, 
quality, sustainability and social conditions. Export value chains include both smallholder 
sourcing systems as large scale production systems where poor households are employed. In 
general, studies show that household benefit from inclusion in these value chains, either 
directly through increased incomes from employment or from contract farming, or indirectly 
from spillover effects on household farm productivity through better access to inputs and 
technology.  
The complexity of the impact of current EU policies on global food security also 
requires complex and comprehensive methods and datasets to measure how the policies affect 
the availability, access and utilization dimensions of food security. This includes a more 
extensive global impact assessment of EU sectoral policies, which complement traditional 
economic and sustainability impact assessments (e.g. standard life cycle analyses) by 
assessment of global, indirect effects, such as in the area of land and water use changes. This 
also relates to policies which, at first sight, are not intended for international markets. One 
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example is EU food standards. Another example is recent policy ideas to reduce that aim at 
reducing the negative externalities generated by intensive agriculture in the EU. Indeed, while 
such policies may contribute to positive environmental benefits in the EU, e.g. by reducing 
significantly fertilizer use, they will also reduce agricultural yields and, unless accompanied 
by changes in consumption (e.g. shifting to a more vegetarian diet, reducing food waste, etc.), 
this will lead increased demand on world markets ceteris paribus. In such situation, indirect 
effects might take place, for example in terms of higher world prices or new land put in 
agricultural production to respond to higher demand addressed to world markets. Such 
indirect global effects could affect food security in other parts of the world in a complex way, 
since they would cascade across products and markets.  
It is necessary that local actions be considered with their global impact. For that 
purpose, economic modeling of EU agricultural, environmental and trade policies is required 
in order to complement traditional sustainability impact assessments (e.g. standard life cycle 
analyses) by assessment of global economic effects. 
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Figure 1: Agricultural support in the EU (%PSE and %NRA) 
 
Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2013), OECD, World Bank  
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Figure 2: International food aid by the EU (thousand tons of wheat)  
 
Source: World Food Programme FAIS database. 
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